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lSelf-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements: Adaptation and Complementarity

Datos del evento
Categoría:Conferencias
Organismo:Universidad de Murcia
Unidad:Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos para la Economía y la Empresa
Descripción:

Seminario de investigación del Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos para la Economía y la Empresa a cargo de Santiago J. Rubio (Universidad de Valencia)

Abst,act. This paper studies the impact of adaptation on the stability of an international emission agreement, To address this issue w e sol ve a three·stage coaition formation game w here in the first stage countries decide w hether or not to sign the agreement, Then, in the second stage, signatories (playing together) and non-signatories (playing individually) select their levels of enissions. Finally, in the third stage, each country decides on its level of adaptation noncooperatively, We solve this game assuming that damages are linear w ith respect to emissions w hich guarantees that emissions are strategic corrplements in the second stage, Our anal y sis shows that the adaptation-nitigation game has a maxirrum of tw o equilibria: an agreement consisting of three countries as occ urs in the mitigation game and the grand co alition, The agreement with three countries is always stable, how ever the grand coalition is stable only if the adaptation costs are low or the marginal bene, t of emissions is high or these two things occur, Moreover, w e find that when the gains from full cooperation are high enough w hat comes along w ith high adaptation costs, the only stable agreement is the one formed by three countries, Thus, the paper suggests that complementarity does not prorrote necessarily the patticipation in an IEA

Fecha inicio:10-05-2019
Fecha fin:10-05-2019
Lugar:Aula de Seminarios del Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos (C403) Facultad de Economía y Empresa
Horario:12.30 h
Datos de contacto
Persona:Isabel Pilar Albaladejo Pina
Correo:isalba@um.es