CRITICISM AND AESTHETIC JUDGMENT
by Andy Hamilton
ABSTRACT
This paper addresses Richard Wollheim's treatment of
criticism in his essay "Criticism as retrieval". His central thesis is that "The task of
criticism is the reconstruction of the creative process, where [that] process
must in turn be thought of as something not stopping short of, but terminating
on, the work of art itself". His
article addresses a central problem in criticism, captured by his
characterisation of "One heroic proposal...the aim of which is to ensure
the democracy of art, [which defines] the ideal critic as one whose cognitive
stock is empty, or who brings to bear on the work of art zero knowledge,
belief, and concepts". Wollheim
regards this proposal as quite impracticable, having little to recommend it
except its democratic aim. I explore
this democratic motivation and produce a more convincing vindication of it. I argue that critical judgment is an
essential development of aesthetic judgment, and that it is democratic while
recognising the value of expertise.
Wollheim's retrieval thesis tends towards what I characterise as an
elitist model of criticism, which should be rejected. I develop a Wittgensteinian account of criticism which employs
the concept of "seeing-as", and also argue against Wollheim's
apparent neglect of the intrinsically evaluative nature of criticism. I conclude by giving a partial defence of
the claim that criticism is essential to aesthetic judgment.
CRITICISM AND AESTHETIC JUDGMENT
by Andy Hamilton
DRAFT [NB comments in
square brackets preceded by xx are comments to myself - please ignore!]
This paper addresses Richard Wollheim's treatment of
criticism in his essay "Criticism as retrieval". Wollheim uses the term "criticism"
for describing "the process of coming to understand a particular work of
art", commenting that while this usage concurs with literary criticism, in
the visual arts it is the name for a purely evaluative activity. His central thesis is that "The task of
criticism is the reconstruction of the creative process, where [that] process
must in turn be thought of as something not stopping short of, but terminating
on, the work of art itself. The
creative process reconstructed, or retrieval complete, the work is then open to
understanding".[1] Much of Wollheim's article is concerned with
issues focussing on what was once termed the "intentional fallacy" -
though he rightly emphasises that the creative process comprises a broader
range of phenomena than artist's intention.
These issues generate a central problem in criticism, captured by
Wollheim's well-known characterisation of "One heroic proposal...the aim
of which is to ensure the democracy of art, [and which defines] the ideal
critic as one whose cognitive stock is empty, or who brings to bear on the work
of art zero knowledge, belief, and concepts".[2] Wollheim regards this proposal as quite
impracticable, having little to recommend it except its democratic aim. One of my principal tasks is to explore this
democratic motivation and produce a more convincing vindication of it. I will argue that critical judgment is an
essential development of aesthetic judgment, and that it is democratic while
recognising the value of expertise.
Wollheim's treatment of criticism as a serious, humane
activity is a salutary one. But his
retrieval thesis tends towards what I will characterise as an elitist model of
criticism. It is only part of the
critical endeavour to reconstruct the artist's intention, to consider whether
it is achieved and whether it is worth achieving.[3] I will also argue against Wollheim's
apparent neglect of the intrinsically evaluative nature of criticism. The issue of evaluation is implicit rather
than explicit in his aesthetics. The
principal exception is the essay "Art and Evaluation", where Wollheim
comments briefly on the substantive values implicit in the standpoint of Art
and its Objects.[4] He does at one point refer to the
"necessary interlock of evaluation and understanding in the domain of
art", but as elsewhere he emphasises that evaluation must be accompanied
by understanding, rather than vice versa.[5] His professed target is a philistine
non-cognitivism; the relative neglect of evaluation may constitute a reaction
against a crude concern with ranking in aesthetic judgments.[6] But a large task of any work on this topic,
as Wollheim recognises, has to be the characterisation of critical judgment
itself. This is the question to which I
now turn.
[0. The social critique of criticism]
Wollheim does not mention the most common usage of the
term "criticism": the use to describe the products of that
journalistic occupation often denigrated for its oppression of artists and
composers. During the early 18th century,
the developing "bourgeois public sphere" of taste was shaped by
Addison and Steele's contributions to the London periodicals The Tatler
and The Spectator. With the
expansion of the press and the increasing commodification of artworks during
the 19th century, artistic criticism increasingly became a professional
activity. But criticism contributed
also to the growing aesthetic autonomy of art.
E.T.A. Hoffmann's anonymous review of Beethoven's 5th Symphony in the
pages of the Allgemeine musikalische Zeitung was seminal in the
elevation of purely instrumental or absolute music. Evidently music criticism at this time was a gentle affair, given
Schumann's comment concerning the Allgemeine musikalische Zeitung:
"Must this damnable German politeness last for centuries?...Why don't the
composers write their own journal against the critics, and demand harsher
judgment on their works?".[7]
Hoffmann's review could also be regarded as artistic
expression in its own right, fulfilling Schlegel's inflated demand that
"The work of criticism...is itself a work of art as independent of the
work it criticises as that work is independent of the material that went into
it".[8] Schlegel's view expresses itself in the
criticism of such as Nietzsche, where the critic's view are of greater interest
than the work under discussion. But
while different kinds of criticism serves different functions, true criticism
should not transcend its source, the artwork that inspired it.
This very brief historical sketch does not imply that
criticism is a relatively recent complement to aesthetic judgment; to say this
would be akin to saying that artworks first appeared in the 18th century. The question belongs with a cluster of
fundamental issues in aesthetics that arise with the developing autonomy of
art, and its growing commodification, from the later 18th century onwards. I will now argue that criticism necessarily
involves expertise, and also evaluation, taking these elements in turn.
1. Democracy, expertise and the cultivation of an
aesthetic sensibility
I wish to defend the reconciling claim that in
criticism, everyone is entitled to an opinion, and yet there is an essential
role for experience and expertise.
There are absurd judgments, and a range of plausible or valid
judgments. Vindicating the reconciling
claim will mean locating a middle way between democratic and elitist
positions. Though the charge of elitism
is sprayed around with great inaccuracy, the cognitivist assumption that
aesthetic judgment is the domain of the expert is "elitist" in the
proper sense of the term. At the
opposite, democratic extreme are those theories which regard aesthetic
judgments as pure expressions of sentiment.
For instance the Abbé Du Bos, influential in the early 18th century,
argued that "Men are not born with knowledge of astronomy or physics, as
they are born with a sensitive faculty".
His account leaves little space for the value of expert opinion, and the
development of an aesthetic sensibility which underlies it.[9] For an acknowledgment of these values, one
turns first to Hume.
Hume and Kant founded philosophical aesthetics in the
sense that they delineated a class of judgments concerning a domain of
understanding and experience which had not previously been recognised as a
unity. Hume sought to reconcile the
subjectivity of individual preference - beauty belongs to the sentiments, it is
not "in" objects - with a "standard of taste" or notion of
correct judgment. Corresponding to each
of these subjectivist and objectivist positions, Hume claims, are two
respective species of common sense, the "axiom" that there is no
disputing about taste, and the common recognition that some judgments of
artistic value - for instance, the claim that Ogilby is a greater talent than
Milton - are simply absurd. Hume
associates the former position with the sceptical "species of philosophy,
which cuts of all hopes of success" in locating a standard of taste:
"thus common sense, which is so often at variance with philosophy,
especially with the sceptical side, is found, in one instance at least, to
agree in pronouncing the same decision".[10] Nonetheless, his project may be viewed as an
attempt to locate the truth in both subjectivism and objectivism, and thereby
reconcile them.
Hume assumes a distinction between sentiment - my
possible liking of Ogilby - and critical judgment - my recognition that Ogilby
is a minor talent. He cites the
necessary attributes of the true critics as: delicacy of taste; practice;
experience of a wide range of objects; lack of prejudice; and common
sense. Hume claims that these five
qualities are purely empirical; whether particular critics possess them
"are questions of fact, not of sentiment". Though the identity of true critics may always be debated, he
argues, it is universally agreed that "the taste of all individuals is not
upon an equal footing, and that some men...will be acknowledged by universal
sentiment [xx not fact?] to have a preference over others". He argues that "the joint verdict of
such [true judges in the finer arts] is the true standard of taste and
beauty". This arguably means: the
joint verdict of true critics constitutes the standard of taste - as opposed to
detecting a pre-existing aesthetic value.
Hume seems to hold that we must be able to recognise who
the true critics are without already being able to make true critical
judgments. But this would be
impossible; the qualities cannot be empirical.
De facto authority does not equate with true critical ability;
even the prestigious Gramophone magazine has its share of false
critics. The ability to identify the
true critics - rather than the recognition that there are true critics - can
come only with one's own developing critical sensibility. A more serious objection, and one often
argued, is that Hume's account unduly subjugates individual response to expert
opinion, thus tending towards the elitist position which I wish to avoid -
expressed for instance in his claim that "the taste of all individuals is
not upon an equal footing".
Nonetheless, the objection misunderstands the role of Hume's ideal
critics. The five qualities are ones to
which all may aspire in the education of a critical sensibility. The aim of such an education is not just to
find out who the true critics are; it is also, thereby, to find out what true
criticism involves. As aspiring
artlovers we do not just want to know, as a matter of fact, which works have
artistic value. We want to be able to
make critical judgments, to become - even if only in an amateur way - true
critics ourselves.
Hence a Humean position does not require that
only an elite can aspire to be true critics.
Hume advocates meritocracy, on the Jeffersonian republican model;
society is hierarchical, in that authority is vested in the best-qualified
citizens, but egalitarian, in that anyone can aspire to earn a place in that
hierarchy. Potentially, indeed, in
contrast to the political sphere, there need be no limit on those who aspire to
become true critics. Here it may be
useful to distinguish three processes: liking, appreciating, and articulating a
critical judgment. Appreciating - which
is not a profession - is knowing that something is good but not necessarily
knowing why. It is more closely allied
to taste than knowledge; hence wine-tasting falls under the heading of
appreciation rather than criticism.
(Wine-tasting can be professional appreciation.) Arguably, Hume does not say that background
knowledge determines judgment, and so the "experts" need be no
better at appreciating works than anyone else.
They can, however, articulate why a piece works, and explain why it has
aesthetic or artistic quality.[11]
Kant's position is problematic in the opposite direction
to Hume's; his democratic assertion of the autonomy of taste seems informed by
an anti-critical bias. Analogous to
Hume's two species of common sense is what Kant calls "the antinomy of
taste": How can a judgment based on individually felt pleasure possibly
claim validity for all other judging subjects?
Kant illustrates the dilemma with Humean "commonplaces":
"Everyone has his own taste" or "there is no disputing about
taste", versus "One can quarrel about taste".[12] The antinomy, he believes, is resolved by an
appeal to the requirement of disinterestedness he has outlined earlier: the
judger "must believe he is justified in requiring a similar liking from
everyone because he cannot discover, underlying this liking, any private
condition" (sec 6). Kant asserts
the autonomy of taste and rejects cognisable "principles of taste":
"By a principle of taste would be meant a principle under which, as
condition, we could subsume the concept of an object and then infer that the
object is beautiful. That, however, is
absolutely impossible. For I must feel
the pleasure directly in my presentation of the object, and I cannot be talked
into that pleasure by means of any bases of proof." That is, it is not possible to base an
aesthetic judgment on testimony; exposure to the object is necessary for the
implicit affective response.[13] Hence what Wollheim terms "the
Acquaintance principle...which insists that judgments of aesthetic value,
unlike judgments of moral knowledge, must be based on first-hand experience of
their objects and are not, except within very narrow limits, transmissible from
one person to another".[14]
Kant continues: "Hence, although, as Hume
says, critics can reason more plausibly than cooks, they still share the same
fate". (Kant is referring to
Hume's remarks in the essay "The Sceptic", which defended a more
subjectivist view than "Of The Standard of Taste".[15]) Further: "If someone reads me his poem,
or takes me to a play that in the end I simply cannot find to my taste, then
let him adduce Batteux or Lessing to prove that his poem is beautiful...
let certain passages that I happen to dislike conform quite well to rules of
beauty (as laid down by these critics and universally recognised); I shall stop
my ears, shall refuse to listen to reasons and arguments, and shall sooner
assume that those rules of the critics are false, or at least do not apply in
the present case, than allow my judgment to be determined by a priori bases of
proof; for it is meant to be a judgment of taste, and not one of understanding
or of reason" (sec 33). An example
of such a priori rules would be the Aristotelian view that a beautiful object
must possess symmetry and formal balance.
It seems that, for Kant, we cannot give reasons one to
another why a certain object should be judged beautiful; since the universally communicable
mental state of disinterested pleasure does not generate a determinate
objective concept, it is indescribable.
Kant moves from "an aesthetic judgment cannot be compelled
by principles of taste" to "no reasons can be given in support of an
aesthetic judgment". [CV 42] Hence the complaint by Wollheim and
others, that he defines the ideal critic as one whose cognitive stock is empty.[16] From the evidence of the passages just
discussed, Kant, in contrast to Hume, gives little guidance about how the
spectator can get better at making aesthetic judgments; he shows little sense,
indeed, that there is such a process. For Kant and many other 18th century writers, it seems,
critics simply prescribe. Hence the
"paradox of taste" outlined by Gaiger: "We are asked to choose
between...the mechanical application of pre-given rules and principles
and...the spontaneous and unrevisable verdict of immediate feeling". Gaiger rightly points out the third
possibility that our affective responses may be revised, not as a result of
external authority, but in light of our increasing knowledge or experience of
artworks.[17] Kant should have recognised that one can be
convinced through discussion - rather than compelled to believe - that one's
judgment is incorrect. For instance,
one might find Mike Figgis's film Leaving Las Vegas ludicrous and the
climax laughable, but on discovering that others disagree, come to question
one's initial reaction. This is not to
deny the value of steadfastly holding one's judgment against the current
critical consensus. A true critic has
to be able to do this, for the test of time operates on criticism too. But the place of genuine critical discourse
and debate must also be acknowledged.
There is a general issue of Kant interpretation here -
the question of how far his discussion pertains to free beauty, and how much to
dependent beauty. It could be argued
that Kant's hostility to criticism occurs within the context of his treatment
of pure judgments of beauty, ones to which no concept of the object is meant to
pertain. In that context, it may be
argued, his position is correct - in contrast to the case of impure judgments
about artworks. However, many of the
passages discussed do occur relatively late in the Critique of Judgment. It should also be noted that Kant is not
claiming that the cultivation of aesthetic sensibility is a development from
pure to impure judgments. On his view,
one might need practice to develop a capacity to make pure judgments of taste
also.
In fact Kant does have a positive account of criticism,
but it does not conform easily to any of these three options - external
authority, critical argument and mere subjective response. In sec. 34 he writes: "There is,
however, something about which critics... should reason". This is the "critique that is an
art", which "merely takes the...empirical rules by which taste
actually proceeds", and criticises the products of fine art.
Kant favoured this critique after rejecting Baumgarten's
science of aesthetics and siding in the 1760s with the British school of
criticism represented by Lord Kames (Henry Home). In the lectures on Logic he observed: "The
philosopher Baumgarten in Frankfurt had the plan to make an aesthetic as
science. More correctly, Home has named
aesthetics criticism, since it gives no rules a priori that sufficiently
determine the judgment, as does logic, but takes its rules a posteriori and
only makes the empirical laws general through comparisons..." (The issue of principles of criticism will be
pursued below.) According to Zammito,
the British had concluded that the only plausible standard of taste is an
empirical consensus among gentlemen of breeding and cultivation: "While
aesthetic pleasure might be felt in all contexts, it would only call for the
reflection and judgment involved in taste in the context of a community which
valued such discrimination. This notion
of a sensus communis [common sense] remained one of Kant's most
important borrowings from the British discussion of taste even in the Third
Critique".[18]
Despite Zammito's comments, the "sensus
communis" must not be interpreted as an "empirical consensus among
gentlemen of cultivation", which subscribes to the empirical rules of
taste actually in operation. Such an
empirical consensus could not constitute an essentially evaluative standard of
taste. Kant is, however, right to say
that criticism is an art, in that its experts have a different status from
scientific ones, and that it is valuable in its own right, in contrast to what
many artists, composers and musicologists might say.
The preceding discussion of Hume and Kant has
illustrated the rival positions which I seek to reconcile. The reconciling claim that in aesthetic
judgment, everyone who is prepared to make a serious effort is entitled to an
opinion [xx which may be mistaken?], and yet there are experts, will now be
developed directly.[19] "Everyone is entitled to an
opinion" does not, of course, refer to the right of free speech, but to
the attention that should be paid to an opinion. The requirement of a serious attempt is important. Anyone who "makes a serious
effort" has standing within the practice of artistic criticism; the serious
neophyte's judgments have to be taken seriously. [xx other Humean conditions?]
A comparable democratising element in the case of science, engineering,
medicine, or history is harder to detect.
One could not seriously claim that everyone is entitled to an opinion
concerning how many kinds of fundamental subatomic particles there are, or
concerning the likely load-bearing capacities of a bridge design. In science, the opinions of the untrained
are of little value; not so in aesthetics.
In art, it is possible - if perhaps rare - for someone largely ignorant
of the history of art to have very powerful and effective responses to
artworks; these might be truer and more valuable than those of an alleged
expert. Knowledge can make one look
past the artwork, and not experience it fully.
There is no equivalent to this occurrence in science.
Certainly the art-science asymmetry - or more correctly,
the aesthetics-science asymmetry - is a striking phenomenon which requires
explanation. It casts on a novel gloss
on the venerable debate concerning two cultures. The asymmetry assumes, correctly I think, that scientific
judgments are purely cognitive, while aesthetic judgments are not; aesthetics
is more concerned with a subjective response.
A Kantian explanation of the asymmetry might be that a capacity to
"taste" the object is universal in creatures with our kinds of
sensory capacities. One could argue
that the audience for art is meant to be universal; everyone ought to be
interested in it, and so judgments about it ought to be universal. Further, the artwork is - as Adorno claims -
inexhaustible, and so any serious opinion about it is worthy of
consideration.
Objections to the asymmetry arise from two
directions. It may be argued, in
elitist vein, that the arts themselves require specialised knowledge - a claim put
forward most notoriously by the composer Milton Babbitt in his article
"Who Cares If You Listen?".[20] But the idea that highly developed modern
artforms require specialised understanding of the history of art is dubious;
the position of Shakespeare and Beethoven at the summit of artistic creation is
in part a result of their wide and enduring appeal. The opposed objection is that the undemocratic status of science
has been overstated. Science has its
own cultural foundations, and its features as a practice overlap with those of
the arts. Science has to keep itself
open to the possibility that an outside opinion may be valuable; the labelling
of such opinions as worthless may block the path of enquiry. An undemocratic model makes science into a
closed system. Against this, however,
it remains the case that useful opinions in science cannot be completely
untrained; a basic scientific literacy is required. The role of the scientific amateur is now almost non-existent;
only in astronomy does the amateur retain a minimal presence.[21]
While the asymmetry requires careful and perhaps
qualified presentation, it does, I believe, express an important truth. But it may well be felt that it is not a
sufficient basis for reconciling the elitist and democratic positions in
aesthetics. "There are
experts" implies that some judgments are privileged; "Everyone is
entitled to an opinion" seems to deny this. One way of effecting a reconciliation is by specifying the kinds
of opinion to which any serious aspiring artlover is entitled. These might concern appreciation in the
sense discussed earlier - which tends to consensus - rather than concerning
reasons and explanations of aesthetic value.
Of course, as Wittgenstein noted, appreciation cannot simply consist of
exclamations such as "Marvellous!" and "Garbage!" - even if
these turn out to be critically justified.
Reference to the development of an aesthetic sensibility may also
constitute part of a reconciling move.
The view that everyone can develop an aesthetic sensibility is a
democratic one. The position is not
"elitist"; the intention of a serious education of sensibility is to
bring more into the fold of artistic appreciation. Development of such a sensibility is a difficult process. It is easier to repeat received critical
opinions than to respond oneself; an individual response implies being honest
about one's reactions, and trusting what one feels - hence the particular
stress on the latter in literary criticism.[22]
The concept of elitism requires expansion. Elitism is a matter of the kind of deference
shown to a restricted group of authority figures, and of a belief concerning
the basis of their authority. In one of
the few serious discussions of the concept, Skorupski defines elitism as a
denial of populism; it is the view that "there can be substantive and not
merely instrumental deliberation on moral, cultural, and spiritual questions,
and that some individuals are more penetrating judges of these questions than
others, and that some are more intellectually or morally more creative than
others...it affirms that such individuals are socially vital and must exert a
due influence through the recognition of their authority in their
sphere." This he terms "moderate
or liberal elitism", and it was advocated by classical 19th century
liberals such as Mill; "strong elitism" is the view that such an
elite should constitute an estate of society - a Church, Vanguard Party or
Caste - with formal powers.[23]
Note that Skorupski refers to authority in moral,
cultural and spiritual matters; evidently it is taken for granted that there is
an elite in scientific matters - which would accord with the art-science
asymmetry. But more needs to be said
about the nature of elitism. It is not
just a matter of some people actually having superior judgment, but of a claim
to some necessity behind this. Roger
Scruton's position would be an example of elitism in the objectionable sense,
since he assumes an impermeable barrier between elite and non-elite; the elite
is a select club, like MENSA.
Connectedly, he tries to make elitism into a moral position; morally
superiority follows from intelligence.
Elitism in this sense asserts a difference of kind between the expert
and the novice - just empirically discriminable? - and tends to the wholly
implausible view that in virtue of their social status or genetic inheritance,
the elite are predisposed towards superior taste. Anyone who opposes that position is a meritocrat, the view
defended here.
The concept of a developing sensibility is made
explicit, if only briefly, in Wittgenstein's remarks on aesthetics. He writes: "In what we call the Arts a
person who has judgment develops. (A
person who has judgment doesn't mean a person who says 'Marvellous!' at certain
things.) If we talk of aesthetic
judgments, we think, among a thousand things, of the Arts...We distinguish
between a person who knows what he is talking about and a person who
doesn't...The word we ought to talk about is 'appreciated'." Wittgenstein then discusses what "appreciation"
consists in, through a characteristic series of examples concerning one of the
999 non-artistic cases - the practical judgment involved ordering a suit at a
tailor's. Distinguishing between a
person who knows what they are talking about, and one who does not, does not of
itself imply an elitist model.
Wittgenstein refers to the development of critical judgment, and his
subsequent remarks should also be noted: "There are lots of people,
well-offish, who have been to good schools, who can afford to travel about and
see the Louvre, etc., and who know a lot about and can talk fluently about
dozens of painters. There is another
person who has seen very few paintings, but who looks intensely at one or two paintings
which make a profound impression on him.
Another person who is broad, neither deep nor wide. Another person who is very narrow,
concentrated and circumscribed. [These]
may all be called 'appreciation'".[24]
Wittgenstein may not be condemning those who "can
talk fluently about dozens of painters".
Although, as just noted, the concept of appreciation may not be entirely
correlative with that of criticism, Wittgenstein's comments suggest more varied
ways in which one can become one of Hume's "ideal critics". Wide experience, for instance, is not
essential. Both Hume and Kant assume
convergence in critical judgment; Wittgenstein, perhaps, would be less unhappy
with the idea of divergence between true critics (though note his comments on
tailoring). Kant might postulate
convergence in aesthetic judgments among rational beings; Wittgenstein would
refer to human beings.
The preceding discussion suggests that Wollheim's heroic
proposal is not necessary for a democratic account of critical judgment. However, there is the further issue of Wittgenstein's
salutary caution towards the idea of judgment in criticism. His denigration of the Kantian form of
aesthetic judgment "X is beautiful" is linked not only to his account
of "beautiful" as attributive rather than predicative - as less of a
property than even Kant conceded. It is
also as result of his emphasis on aesthetic experience and response, or
"coming to see", as opposed to the verdict-implying term
"judgment".[25] For Wittgenstein, the explanation that
yields musical understanding, for instance, must involve an experienced
insight. The subject comes to hear the
work differently as a result of the explanation. The mere giving of information is not sufficient; that
information must be mobilised in experience.
Perceptual engagement may, moreover, be linked with affective engagement
(pp. 4-5). This, I would argue, is a
true vindication of the Kantian Acquaintance principle.[26] To develop these considerations, one needs
to turn to Wittgenstein's discussion of seeing- and hearing-as. Wollheim has developed the concept in the
context of picturing, but its import in aesthetics may be more general. I will now argue that developing an
aesthetic sensibility involves getting the student to notice aesthetic aspects
which they had not noticed before.[27]
2. A Wittgensteinian account of criticism
Wittgenstein insisted that "aesthetics is
descriptive": "What it does is to draw one's attention to
certain features, to place things side by side so as to exhibit these
features. To tell a person 'This is the
climax' is like saying 'This is the man in the puzzle picture'. Our attention is drawn to a certain feature,
and from that point forward we see that feature".[28] Similarly in Moore's account of
Wittgenstein's lectures: "Reasons...in Aesthetics, are 'of the nature of
further descriptions': e.g. you make a person see what Brahms was driving at by
showing him lots of pieces by Brahms, or by comparing him with a contemporary
author; and all that Aesthetics does is 'to draw your attention to a thing', to
'place things side by side'".[29] These remarks are hint enough, but these
remarks in the discussion of "seeing-as" in Part II of PI make it
clear that Wittgenstein connects that concept with aesthetics: "Here it
occurs to me that in... aesthetic matters we use the words: 'You have to see it
like this, this is how it is meant'; 'When you see it like this,
you see where it goes wrong'; 'You have to hear this bar as an introduction';
'You have to hear it in this key'; 'You must phrase it like this' (which
can refer to hearing as well as playing)".[30]
Wittgenstein targets two empiricist accounts in his
discussion of seeing-as. Both, he
claims, give mistaken accounts of the two "objects" of sight (or
hearing). Clearly I recognise that the
puzzle-diagram or picture itself has not changed; this is the first sense of
object of sight. But I now see it
differently; this is the second sense of object of sight; for instance, I now
see it as a rabbit, now as a duck.
Notice that Wittgenstein says "two 'objects' of sight", and
not "two objects of sight"; this suggests that he does not really
think that there is a second object; this second "object" might be a
private experience. On the standard
empiricist view, noticing aspects involves an inference from, or interpretation
of, more primitive sensory data, viz. "sense-data": shapes and
colours. For Gestalt psychologists such
as Kohler, in contrast, organisation is "given in experience" like
shape and colour; it is an original feature of the visual field, not something
imported into visual experience by learning.
It is "gestalts" (organised or "circumscribed
wholes" as Kohler put it) that are given, not "atoms"; so a
change of the organisation of the visual field, as in the duck-rabbit, is a
"real transformation of sensory facts".
Wittgenstein's objection to the Gestaltists is that they
cannot acknowledge that in one sense of "object of sight", the object
of sight remains the same. That is,
there is a sense in which one experiences what is seen as being the same
object; whereas on the Gestalt view, this is inferred. The latter view puts the two objects of
sight on the same level, failing to recognise that there is a sense in which
what is "sensorily presented" to the subject remains the same. In contrast, the standard empiricist view,
though gaining plausibility from the fact that in one sense, what is seen
remains constant, cannot acknowledge that there is another sense in which one
experiences what is seen as changing.
It is not just that one infers to, for instance, a duck or a rabbit.
Wittgenstein wants to undermine the traditional debate
concerning whether suddenly noticing an aspect is seeing or interpreting. He regards the phenomenon as the meeting
point of the sensory and the intellectual, and this clearly associates the
concept with the domain of the aesthetic.
Falk puts the problem well: when I manage to see the figure as a rabbit,
"the change that occurs will not be in what is sensorily presented to me,
since that has remained the same [cf. Gestalt view]; nor will it be in what
thought accompanies the sensory input, since the thought that this could be
seen as a rabbit was present earlier and was not sufficient for the change [cf.
standard empiricist view]. What must occur,
it seems, is that the thought must attach itself to what is sensorily
presented, thereby causing it to look different. Since this way of being appeared to depends on thought...it
cannot be like seeing a colour or hearing a sound. It is not...a phenomenal experience...a perceptual state that
remains constant across recognitional change.
On the other hand, it doesn't consist in nothing but the fact that one
deploys the [conceptual] technique [i.e. being able to recognise something as a
rabbit]".[31] Wittgenstein wants to deny both (i) that the
dawning of an aspect is simply a matter of what is seen being interpreted
differently and (ii) that it is straightforwardly a matter of a different
perceptual experience, as the Gestalt account has it (with the temptation to
construe this experience as a sense-datum or inner object).
If the subject's coming to hear a piece of music
differently as a result of receiving an aesthetic explanation is to be
assimilated to hearing-as, there must also be something that stays the same - there
is no change in what is sensorily presented to them. Consider the claim that the Beatles song "Yesterday"
opens with closure - it could end with the opening phrase. [xx Deryck Cooke] If I tell you that it begins with a perfect cadence, that information
may not much advance aesthetic understanding.
Once I whistle it, and explain that it involves immediate closure, it
should do so. There is something
significant about that closure, as the words reveal; a finality about the
ending of the singer's happiness. If I
play a recording of "Yesterday", outline this feature and then play
the record again, there will be an object of hearing that stays the same, in
that the recording has not changed, and an object that changes - the audience
should now hear the opening phrase as a closure. (Non-Western listeners may not hear this; it needs Western ears
to hear the sense in a cadence.)
Another example would be playing or hearing something as
a musical phrase. Initially, the novice
piano pupil may just "play the notes", treating them as isolated
sounds, not hearing them as group of notes, a unity or statement. If the teacher merely plays the notes, and
then phrases it, the pupil should hear what was wrong. In this case there is an audible difference
between the two versions, and there is no object of hearing that stays the
same, so this is not an example of hearing-as.
However, if the pupil listens to an adequate recording of the piece
before and after the teacher's explanation, there will be a change of aspect. In one sense, what they hear will stay the
same; in another sense, it will change, because they now notice the
phrasing.
A central - and rather intractable - problem concerning
the application of Wittgenstein's concept of "seeing-as" to aesthetics
is whether, in getting to see a painting or hear a piece of music in a certain
way, any ways of seeing-as or hearing-as are ruled out as incorrect? Is there a constraint on the construction of
purely fanciful ways of seeing- or hearing-as?
[xx artist's intention, knowledge of art history] The issue arises in an interesting
development of a Wittgensteinian treatment of aesthetics found in a series of
articles by Mark Rowe. Rowe argues that
"critical reasoning is a kind of rhetoric rather than a kind of
theoretical argument", and sees criticism as involving "comparing,
contrasting, accentuating points of interest, suggested Gestalts, and so
on".[32] Rowe cites several examples of the
"Gestalt switch" effected by literary criticism, including Cleanth
Brookes's analysis of Wordsworth's "Immortality Ode". Stanza III, Brooks comments, shifts the
emphasis from sight to sound, with the effect that of "a blind man trying
to enter the joyful dawn world".
Rowe comments that having noted Brooks's analysis, "it is most
unlikely that you will ever be able to read the poem again without observing
the change from sight to hearing - it will leap at you from the page".[33]
In his concern to reject general critical principles,
however, Rowe moves too far in the direction of subjectivism. He argues that "What is wrong with the
idea that criticism is based on principles is that it tries to show that there
is a general logic of critical words which is independent of context. In fact, the critical remark about pizzicati
considered above ['the passage is exhilarating because of its pizzicati']
claims only that I respond in this way to those pizzicati
in that perceived context. As a
critic, I try to make you share my pleasure by using the general word
'pizzicato'".[34] This is a surprisingly subjectivist
position; Rowe's argument seems to make the move criticised by Gaiger, from
rejection of general principles to subjectivism. These perhaps incautious comments are in tension with Rowe's claim
in a later article that "A good interpretation alters how we see the thing
interpreted"; they also conflict with Wittgenstein's own remark, quoted
above, that "you make a person see what Brahms was driving at by showing
him lots of pieces by Brahms...".[35] The debate has parallels with that concerning
particularism in ethics; certainly one should abstract from the "I"
in "I respond in this way to those pizzicati in that perceived
context", because otherwise we do not even have critical debate, simply
the expression of personal preference.
The experiential changes shown in "seeing-as"
constitute a central aspect of criticism, and may be the terminus of much
critical activity. But they do not
exhaust its remit, and tend to place an exclusively aesthetic interpretation on
critical practice. There is a
theoretical level of critical judgments that do not make direct appeal to the
experiential, for instance the objection that "after modernism, it is no
longer possible to create authentic narrative opera". Such a claim could form part of a modernist
or postmodernist critique of the medium, which argued that the use of words to
convey the plot constitutes a compromise both of music and text, and allows
continued value only to varieties of "anti-opera", such as Luigi
Nono's agit-prop or Birtwistle's or Tippett's use of archetypes.[36] The existence of such critiques belongs more
to the sphere of understanding which Wollheim's account of criticism
emphasises. The importance of the
experiential is one element of criticism which I have sought to develop; another
is the importance of evaluation, against which Wollheim has a possible bias,
and these issues I now address.
3. Evaluation
Wollheim's apparent neglect of evaluation is in part a
product of the philosophical milieu from which Art and its Objects
(first edition 1968) arose. Emotivist
subjectivism, or a non-objectivist prescriptivism, was much more prevalent in
ethics and aesthetics, and Wollheim was concerned to reject the consequent
denigration of understanding in aesthetic judgment. This led him perhaps to underplay the essential synthesis of
feeling, understanding and evaluation which such judgments involve. The characterisation of this synthesis has
to be handled carefully, however. My
argument in this section is that critical judgment does not have to involve an
evaluation directly, but that it must at least provide the material or basis
for one. Hence the biases apparent in
various areas of criticism, which Wollheim notes when he comments that criticism
in literature refers to the process of understanding a work, while in the
visual arts it refers to a purely evaluative activity, need to be
eliminated. Criticism involves
understanding relevant to an evaluation of the work. It follows that whether a judgment about an artwork belongs to criticism
or, alternatively, scholarship or musical analysis, depends on the use to which
it is put. For instance, a discussion
of the origins of the varieties of pigment in Turner's watercolours, or of the
kinds of paper which he used, might be a purely scholarly investigation not
involving critical judgment. But if it
were shown that these technical considerations had a bearing on Turner's
artistic practice, the situation would change.[37]
The question of the relation of criticism and evaluation
is thrown into sharpest relief in the case of music, because in comparison to
the other arts, it has a highly-developed practice of
"analysis". In the academic
study of music, hostility towards criticism and evaluation is often expressed,
and not by analysts. Thus it may be
that while Wollheim neglects evaluation, musicologists and analysts reject
it. For musicologists, criticism seems
to be regarded as a species of journalism, and aesthetics is denigrated as
imprecise and evasive in contrast to the analytic treatment of musical
construction. In his book Criticism,
for instance, musicologist Hans Keller attacks critics as members of a
"phoney profession".
Rejecting the common justification that the critic serves as a bridge
between composer and listener, he cites the countless instances of critics
disparaging contemporary music: "The first requirement for a successful
bridge is, in fact, suspension of judgment, of evaluation... Evaluation is the
most effective defence the human mind has devised against what it feels to be a
threat, and all new art is felt to be a threat if it is good - new and true -
enough...consistently, criticism has put obstacles in the way of understanding,
has even destroyed bridges built laboriously by the public, the recipients of
art themselves". More recently
however, he continues, critics have rushed into positive rather than negative
incomprehension, to no better effect.
Keller's conclusion is that "If genuine, musical bridge-building is
necessary and possible at all...it is the job of analysis, not of
criticism".[38]
Keller is best-known for his conception of non-verbal or functional analysis. On this view, the only really valid analysis of a piece of music is itself a piece of music. But Keller is prepared to offer verbal analytic claims also - for instance that the transitional tune in the opening movement of Mozart's "Haffner" Symphony is a not true second subject. This is not likely to be something on which just anyone's opinion will be of value; it might be argued to be closer to a scientific than an aesthetic judgment. However, Keller's approach itself has evaluative assumptions concerning what is significant in a piece of music. Perhaps he believed that his analyses were value-neutral, but his methods are Schoenbergian, privileging thematic and motivic connections. Keller might accept this, but argue that analysis does not evaluate the work analysed, indeed does not offer an evaluation at all. However, the analyst has to choose which works are worth analysing; and Keller himself inevitably engages in critical or evaluative judgment whenever he refers to "great artists" such as Jane Austen, Mozart and Benjamin Britten.
The aspiration to value-freedom is found more generally
in much contemporary musicology. An
interesting example is the sympathetic discussion of French grand opera in
Roger Parker's excellent "The Opera Industry", in The Cambridge
History of Nineteenth-Century Music.[39] The grand operatic style is personified by
Meyerbeer, whose works Wagner famously stigmatised as involving "effects
without causes"; a notable precursor and exemplar is Auber's "La
muette de Protici", which ends with the spectacle of the heroine throwing
herself into the lava of an erupting Vesuvius.
Parker asks why, if grand opera was so influential, it has fallen from
the repertory. He explains how
Meyerbeer's cosmopolitanism became out of tune with later 19th century
nationalism, when national opera became bound up with nation-building. But his comments on why grand opera has
continued to enjoy a low reputation into our own times are less
convincing. As an alternative to
historical explanation, "We might of course retreat into arguments about
'musical value'", he remarks sceptically.
This scepticism is unwarranted, I would argue. In trying to show that continuing neglect is unjustified, one is
assuming, and may want to argue, that these operas have musical or aesthetic
value.
Indeed, I would claim, investigation of historical
importance which abstracts from aesthetic value is an impossible and fruitless
enterprise. "Historical
importance" cannot be purely historical - the influence has to be exerted
on, or to terminate in, an artistically important figure. Thus Louis Armstrong was influenced by
popular vaudeville trumpeters and maybe, regrettably, by Guy Lombardo's
"sweet music"; one can cite Billie Holiday's treatment of Tin Pan
Alley material, or Miles Davis's use of popular song-writer Cyndi Lauper. There has to be reference to a line of
development of valuable works. One could
perhaps attempt to write a history of an artform that simply dealt with the
most popular products, in terms of sales.
But a history of popular music, as a genre, makes its own qualitative
judgments, distinguishing bubblegum pop - the trashiest chart material - from
the rock canon, for example. Musicology
is the study of a musical repertoire against its social background. The commercially successful is the social
background against which the significant artworks, only some of which are
commercially successful in their own time or even later, are created. In fact, I would argue, Parker's practice
belies his words; despite postmodern neuroses about aesthetic value and the
test of time, he cannot really believe what he says.
Returning to Wollheim's discussion, his treatment of
what he calls the "scrutiny view" of criticism brings out his neglect
of evaluation, as well as his tendency towards an elitist model of
criticism. Wollheim cites the scrutiny view
as one alternative to the retrieval model which wishes to defend, and writes
that it "needs to be filled out by a definition of the person whose
scrutiny is authoritative, or 'the ideal critic', and any such definition must
be in terms of the cognitive stock upon which the critic can draw". There follows his heroic, democratic
proposal (p. 194). Wollheim perhaps
assumes that the ideal critic has to be an authority figure, in a sense which
transgresses the Acquaintance principle (though he does not explicitly say
this). In fact, as the discussions by
Hume and Wittgenstein show, the ideal critic does not have to be characterised
in terms of the cognitive stock upon which they can draw. Rather, they need to possess the five
qualities which Hume adduces, or some elaboration thereof. Furthermore, even the retrieval view has
need of such critics, as opposed to the experts in the scientific sense which
Wollheim's discussion of retrieval suggests (even if he would disavow such a
view). This is because the practice of
the ideal critic is something which any artlover should seek to emulate in
their own practice. Criticism is not
simply the dissemination of understanding.
4. A conceptual connection between aesthetic and
critical judgment
I will conclude by looking at the claim that there is a conceptual
connection between aesthetic and critical judgments, through an examination of
the notion of "nature criticism".
An obvious objection to this connection is the denial that all aesthetic
judgments are critical judgments. A
spontaneous, apparently uncritical aesthetic response is possible even towards
artworks, and certainly towards natural beauty, it may be argued; and
spontaneous expressions of delight are not critical judgments. Wittgenstein's discussion in the Lectures
and Conversations on Aesthetics offers an account of this problematic
category of response. On his account,
they would be mere expressions of approval or disapproval. But they are the beginnings of critical
judgment, the basis for a sensibility which can be educated.
One obvious difficulty for the claim of a conceptual
connection between aesthetic and critical judgment is the existence of
aesthetic judgments of non-artworks, such as natural beauty. There is no analogue of an understanding of
artistic purpose in the case of natural objects or scenes; no vision is being
expressed, nature is "mute".
Thus it seems that the possibility of "nature criticism", on
the model of art criticism, is limited.
The inegalitarian thesis that some natural objects are not beautiful, or
are less beautiful than others, seems required for a critical aesthetics of
nature; but the egalitarian thesis that everything in nature is beautiful,
which constitutes a positive aesthetics of nature, is more widely
supported. Thus it may be argued that
the aesthetics of nature is positive while the aesthetics of art is critical.[40] However, I wish to argue that there can be
critical judgments of natural beauty.
The idea of "nature criticism" is unfamiliar
and under-explored. Zangwill comments
that "anti-formalists want us to appreciate nature with the eyes of a
connoisseur. But I think that childlike
wonder is often more appropriate".[41] Indeed the natural equivalent of art
criticism and the canon of great works does seem attenuated. But Ronald Hepburn's distinction between
serious and trivial appreciation of nature offers the beginnings of an account
of nature criticism (though he does not use the term).[42] For him, trivialised appreciation includes
the scenery-cult, excessive detachment as an observer, and a sentimental
neglect of nature red in tooth and claw.
Serious appreciation, in contrast, involves the imagination, not in the
inconsequential sense of seeing human forms in clouds, but of making some truth
vivid to perception.[43] "I had long known that the earth
was not flat, but I had never before realised its curvature till I
watched that ship disappear on the horizon"; "I had seen from the map
that this was a deserted moor, but not till I stood in the middle of it did I
realise its desolation" - I shout and no one hears.
One could argue that the National Parks, and landscapes
classified as "areas of outstanding natural beauty", form a
canon. Some natural landscapes reveal
their secrets gradually; one might say that mountains, lakes or sea create an immediate
impression, whereas fenland requires a more subtle sensibility. The most developed models of nature
criticism, found in competitions for the finest blooms in the Chelsea Flower
Show or the Royal Horticultural Society, concern Kantian dependent beauty, and
involve judgments such as "This is how a stamen in this species should
be". But plants which are bred and
nurtured are already in some sense artefactual. In the case of humanly-untouched nature there is by definition no
"nature practice" for criticism to shape, in the way that art
criticism informs artistic practice; but it will shape future responses to
nature.
The idea of nature criticism helps to defuse an
interesting line of argument which Wollheim develops from the principal target
of Art and its Objects. That
target, he writes, is "the tendency to conceive of aesthetics as primarily
the study of the spectator and his role...his responses, his interests, his
attitudes, and the characteristic tasks he sets himself. Now the upshot of such an aesthetic is that
works of art will emerge as on an equal footing with works of nature, in that
both are looked upon to provide the spectator with a sensuous array of colours,
forms, sounds, movements, to which he may variously respond". This upshot follows from the fact that
recognition of the intentions of the artist, resulting in a differential
attitude, is at odds with the primacy of the spectator. If the artist is not accorded at least
equality with the spectator, Wollheim argues, they drop out of the picture
completely.[44] Though the underlying target may be a valid
one, the formalist picture of aesthetic responses to nature which Wollheim
presents should be resisted. Artworks
and natural scenes and objects can be on an "equal footing" in terms
of a non-formalist appreciation, if the concept of nature criticism is
vindicated.[45] There is a place for understanding in the
case of natural as well as artistic beauty.
In this section I have considered the objection that
there are aesthetic judgments which are not critical judgments. There is also the contrary objection that
not all critical judgments are aesthetic judgments. Though a less plausible claim, this objection raises issues
concerning the evaluative nature of criticism which have already been touched
upon. But that is material for another
occasion.[46]
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[3]But I agree with Wollheim's
objections to "radical historicism" - that the role of criticism is
revisionary, making the artwork speak "to us, today".
[5]For instance: "It is enough
to point to moral philosophy to show how little can be achieved if evaluation
is studied totally outside the context of understanding..." (Wollheim
(1980), p. 228).
[6][xx Ranking judgments became
progressively less valuable the more different the cases are - Milton and
Ogilby is OK, Milton and Shakespeare, not much point...]
[8]Schlegel (1971). [Tanner on two kinds of critic - Nietzsche
book?] The history of criticism is
discussed in the entry on "Criticism" in Kelly ed. (1998), especially
Michael Orwicz on "critical reception" (Routledge Enc. p. 463). Critical reception or reception history is
integral to art history. An historian
of the arts is inevitably making critical judgments of artistic importance, for
instance - on which more below.
[xx look at Orwicz again]
[11][xx Indeed, given that Hume
adheres to an affective account of judgments of taste, his position could not
be elitist.] [xx 3-tier pyramid]
[15]Hume does in fact conclude by
agreeing with Kant that critics "share the same fate"; given a
conflict over musical preferences, "You have not even any single argument,
beyond your own taste, which you can employ in your behalf" (Hume (1985),
p. 163).
[19][Street-light design example,
civil engineers cf architects] We also
say: There are those without taste.
[21][xx Even in Kant's time,
discussions of genius include science as well as art - Kivy?] [Habermas, Apel].
[22][xx While an aesthetic judgment
may be absurd, its value is not exhausted by its truth-value. The complete novice's judgment can be
disregarded, though you would not say this to them.]
[24]pp. 6-9 - unqualified references
are to the Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and
Religious Belief.
[26]Wittgenstein's treatment is
echoed in Scruton's discussion, where reasoning in favour of an aesthetic
judgment concludes not in a thought, nor an action, but an experience (Scruton
(1997), p. 381).
[28]Ambrose ed., Wittgenstein's
Lectures: Cambridge 1932-35, pp. 38-9.
[xx descriptive as opposed to causal?
Cioffi]
[31]p. 57, Falk ref. - Falk goes on to
reject this account, but it at least sets up the problem, one that can be hard
to see at all at first.
[35]Rowe (2002a), MS p. 2. Conflicting evaluations, cf. conflicting grounds
for an agreed evaluation; no experimental procedures in Cioffi's sense could
decide the latter, just rhetoric.
[41]Zangwill (2000), pp. 223-4. Formalists can also engage in criticism
rather than child-like wonder, however.
[42]See for instance his
(1993). This is a distinction shared
with Carlson, though the latter seems ready to elide trivial appreciation with
the non-aesthetic. He comments that
"we can, of course, approach nature as we sometimes approach art, that is,
we can simply enjoy its forms and colours or enjoy perceiving it
however we may happen to", but this is not for him a deep level of
appreciation (Carlson (2000), p. 68).